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Abstract
Sean Carroll has recently argued that theories predicting that observa-
tions are dominated by Boltzmann Brains should be rejected because they
are cognitively unstable: “they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably
believed.” While such Boltzmann Brain theories are indeed cognitively un-
stable, one does not need to appeal to this argumentation to reject them.
Instead, they may be ruled out by conventional Bayesian reasoning, which is
sufficient to keep Boltzmann Brains at bay.
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1 Introduction
Many cosmologists now recognize that it is not sufficient just to know the dynamical
laws of physics (sometimes misleadingly called the ‘theory of everything,’ which we
do not know yet, though superstring/M theory is one leading candidate that is only
partially understood). One also needs to know the quantum state (or the boundary
conditions giving it), which is so far even less understood. However, even that is
insufficient, since we also need to know how to get probabilities (or perhaps more
strictly, measures) of observations from the quantum state [1].
There are plausible postulates for some aspects of the dynamical laws and for
the quantum state that, when coupled with simple ideas for the rules for getting the
probabilities or measures of observations, lead to the disturbing conclusion that the
measure seems to be concentrated on Boltzmann Brain observations, observations
of Boltzmann Brains (BBs) that arise from relatively rapid thermal fluctuations
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] or quantum fluctuations [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], rather than
observations of Ordinary Observers (OOs) that arise from relatively slow evolution.
The seemingly plausible way in which Boltzmann Brain domination arises is that
Ordinary Observers are believed to require something like radiation from a nearby
star (e.g., from the Sun in our case), but stars have finite lifetimes and (leaving out
Boltzmann stars, which would occur much, much less frequently than Boltzmann
brains) exisr only during a finite time during the history of the universe. Therefore,
Ordinary Observers can collectively exist only for a finite period of the history of the
universe, whereas Boltzmann Brains can collectively exist over a much, much longer
time according to the latest preferred theories about the universe, Thus the total
number of Boltzmann Brains over all of spacetime can greatly dominate over the
number of Ordinary Observers. Therefore, assuming that each suitable configuration
of an observer (whether a BB or an OO) leads to a comparable probability or measure
for the corresponding observation, the much greater number of BBs over OOs makes
the total probability or measure of BBs much greater than that of OOs.
In many simple models, the total measure of BB observations is so much greater
than that of OOs that even the restricted class of BB observations that are exactly
like ours has much greater measure than the OO observations exactly like ours.
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Therefore, if we accept such models, we should think with high probability that we
are the much more probable BBs.
Sean Carroll has recently argued [15] that although we cannot rule out such
a model on statistical grounds (since it does predict that almost all observations
like ours are made by Boltzmann Brains), we should rule it out for being cognitively
unstable, because if we accept it and believe that our observations come from purely
random thermal or quantum fluctuations, that would give us no reason for believing
the model that has such random thermal or quantum fluctuations. Therefore, as
Carroll puts it, we should “reject cosmological models that would be dominated by
Boltzmann Brains (or at least Boltzmann Observers among those who have data
just like ours), not because we have empirical evidence against them, but because
they are cognitively unstable and therefore self-undermining and unworthy of serious
consideration.”
However, for a Bayesian who believes that a Bayesian analysis should in principle
be sufficient in science (assuming that one can calculate the probability of one’s
observation for all theories for which one assigns a significant prior probability,
which of course is no mean task, and leaving aside the inevitable subjectivity of the
prior probabilities), it seems a bit disturbing to have to invoke a different principle
(cognitive instability) to rule out Boltzmann Brain theories.
Here I shall show that a Bayesian analysis by itself is in principle sufficient to give
very low posterior probabilities to theories that predict domination by Boltzmann
Brain observations.
2 A Bayesian analysis of Ordinary Observer vs.
Boltzmann Brain theories
In a Bayesian analysis, if there are a set of possible observations Oj and theories Ti
with prior probabilities P (Ti), such that the probability of observation Oj in theory
Ti is P (Oj|Ti), then the posterior probability of theory Ti, given observation Oj, is
P (Ti|Oj) =
P (Oj|Ti)P (Ti)∑
k P (Oj|Tk)P (Tk)
. (1)
Now let us suppose there are two sets of possible observations, a number NO
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of observations Oj with 1 ≤ j ≤ NO that are relatively ordered observations
that Ordinary Observers can have, and a number ND of observations Oj with
NO + 1 ≤ j ≤ NO +ND that are relatively disordered observations that only Boltz-
mann Brains have. Since there can be thermal or quantum fluctuations to arbitrary
Boltzmann Brain configurations (including configurations the same as what Ordi-
nary Observers have), I shall assume that Boltzmann Brains can also have any of
the relatively ordered observations as well. Since presumably there are far more
relatively disordered observations than ordered ones, I shall assume that ND ≫ NO.
I shall further assume that we use one of our observations to test the different the-
ories, and that this observation is a relatively ordered one, say for concreteness the
observation O1.
Next, suppose we have two theories to test against our observation O1, theories T1
and T2. Let theory T1 be the theory in which there are NOO Ordinary Observers and
no Boltzmann Brains. Assume for inessential simplicity that each Ordinary Observer
has the same number m of observations, and that each of these m observations for
one single Ordinary Observer is distinct. (For a human who lives about two billion
seconds, this might be of the order of 1010 if there are roughly five observations
per second, but the actual number does not matter.) Assume that the universe of
theory T1 is sufficiently large that the number of observational occurrences, mNOO,
is the positive integer n multiplied by the set of NO ordered observations, so that
mNOO = nNO. (The integer n is the number of occurrences of each relatively
ordered observation Oj with 1 ≤ j ≤ NO.) Further assume, again for inessential
simplicity, that each of the NO relatively ordinary observations occurs the same
number of times n.
Now suppose that theory T1 specifies that each occurrence of one of the m obser-
vations of each one of the NOO Ordinary Observers makes a unit contribution of the
measure to the corresponding relatively ordered observation Oj with 1 ≤ j ≤ NO.
Then the total measure of all observations in this theory is mNOO = nNO, and each
of the NO relatively ordered observations that have positive measure in this theory
has measure n.
For Bayes’ theorem, we take the conditional probability P (Oj|Ti) to be the nor-
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malized measure that the theory Ti assigns to the observation Oj, so that for each
theory, the sum of the conditional probabilities or normalized measures over all
observations is unity. Therefore, for theory T1, the conditional probability or nor-
malized measure for each relatively ordered observation is P (Oj|Ti) = 1/NO (for
1 ≤ j ≤ NO), and for each relatively disordered observation is P (Oj|Ti) = 0 (for
NO + 1 ≤ j ≤ NO + ND). In particular, since theory T1 is being tested by the
relatively ordered observation O1, its likelihood is
P (O1|T1) =
1
NO
. (2)
Let theory T2 be the theory that not only has NOO Ordinary Observers that
each have m observations, with these mNOO = nNO total number of instances of
observations equally spread among the NO relatively ordered observations so that
they give a unnormalized measure n for each relatively ordered observation Oj with
1 ≤ j ≤ NO, but that theory T2 also has NBB Boltzmann Brains. Since Boltzmann
Brains are short-lived thermal or quantum fluctuations, assume for inessential sim-
plicity that each Boltzmann Brain makes only one observation, but also assume that
the number NBB of Boltzmann Brains is some positive integer p multiplied by the
total number of possible observations, NO+ND, and that this number is much larger
than the number of occurrences mNOO = nNO of relatively ordered observations by
Ordinary Observations, so that NBB = p(NO + ND) ≫ mNOO = nNO. Assume
that theory T2 has the Boltzmann Brains contribute a total unnormalized measure
NBB = p(NO +ND) that for simplicity is equally spread among all NO +ND possi-
ble observations, so that each possible observation gains an unnormalized measure
p from Boltzmann Brains.
Then when we add the measure contributed by Ordinary Observers, n for each
of the NO relatively ordered observations, to the measure contributed by Boltzmann
Brains, p for each of the NO + ND total number of observations, we get that the
unnormalized measure is n + p for each of the NO relatively ordered observations
and p for each of the ND relatively disordered observations. The total unnormalized
measure in theory T2 is thus (n+p)NO+pND. Therefore, the normalized measure for
each of the NO relatively ordered observations (including the observation O1 being
used to test the thoery) is (n+ p)/[(n+ p)NO + pND], and the normalized measure
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for each of the ND relatively disordered observations is p/[(n+ p)NO + pND]. This
implies that when tested by the relatively ordered observation O1, theory T2 has a
likelihood
P (O1|T2) =
n+ p
(n+ p)NO + pND
. (3)
Eqs. (2) and (3) give the ratios of these likelihoods as
P (O1|T1)
P (O1|T2)
= 1 +
pND
(n+ p)NO
=
(
1 +
ND
NO
)
1 +mNOO/NBB
1 + (1 +ND/NO)mNOO/NBB
. (4)
Furthermore, using Bayes’ theorem Eq. (1), the ratio of the posterior probabilities
of the Ordinary Observer theory T1 and of the Boltzmann Brain theory T2 is
P (T1|O1)
P (T2|O1)
=
P (T1)
P (T2)
(
1 +
ND
NO
)
1 +mNOO/NBB
1 + (1 +ND/NO)mNOO/NBB
. (5)
Surely the number ND of possible relatively disordered observations is much
greater than the number NO of possible relatively ordered observations, orND/NO ≫
1. But initially plausible Boltzmann Brain theories tend to have the number NBB of
Boltzmann Brains enormously larger than the number NOO of Ordinary Observers,
and even enormously larger than the number of Ordinary Observers multiplied by
the number m of observations they each make during their lifetime (this m being
in comparison with 1 observation assumed here for each Boltzmann Brain during
its typically very short lifetime), so that NBB/(mNOO) ≫≫ 1. Therefore, I shall
assume that
NBB
mNOO
≫
ND
NO
≫ 1. (6)
As a consequence, we get that the likelihood of the Ordinary Observer theory T1 is
much greater than the likelihood of the Boltzmann Brain theory T2,
P (O1|T1)≫ P (O1|T2) (7)
The idea is that because Boltzmann Brains add extra unnormalized measure
to the observations in a way that is less for the relatively ordered observation O1
being used to test the theory than for elements of a set of other observations (the
relatively disordered ones), they dilute the normalized measure of the observation
O1 and therefore reduce the likelihood of the theory that includes such Boltzmann
Brains.
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Of course, this is not the whole story, because to get the ratio of the posterior
probabilities P (T1|O1) and P (T2|O1) as given by Eq. (5), one must also include the
ratio of prior probabilities P (T1) and P (T2). The main reason that Boltzmann Brains
have been seen as a problem is that they are predicted by what naively seems to be
simpler theories than Ordinary Observer theories that avoid Boltzmann Brains, so
one often takes P (T1) < P (T2). However, because the ratio of likelihoods is usually
so much in favor of the Ordinary Observer theory, even if P (T1) < P (T2), one ends
up with the Ordinary Observer theory having the greater posterior probability:
P (T1|O1) > P (T2|O1) if
P (T2)
P (T1)
<
(
1 +
ND
NO
)
1 +mNOO/NBB
1 + (1 +ND/NO)mNOO/NBB
. (8)
The right hand side of this inequality is generally so large that it should not be
hard to find a theory T1 that is not so complex that its prior probability would
reasonably be assigned so low a value that the inequality (8) would be violated.
If indeed (8) holds, then without invoking cognitive instability or needing to use
it for setting the prior probabilities (which can be set by using Occam’s razor to
assign higher prior probabilities to simpler theories, so long as one does not make
the ratio of priors on the left side of the inequality (8) larger than the right hand
side), this straightforward Bayesian analysis assigns Boltzmann Brain theories, in
which Boltzmann Brains strongly dominate over Ordinary Observers, lower posterior
probabilities than Ordinary Observer theories, in which Boltzmann Brains do not
dominate over Ordinary Observers.
Thus Bayes keep Boltzmann Brains at bay.
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